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By D avid C ole*
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion. ...
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority
in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)
[Margaret Randall's] writings go far beyond mere dissent, disagreement with, or
criticism of the United States or its policies. Her associations with, and her activities
and writings in support of the communist dominated governments of Cuba, North
Vietnam, and Nicaragua; and her advocacy and support of revolutionary activity in
Mexico, as well as her affiliation with and participation in Communist Party activi-
ties, warrant the denial of her application for adjustment of status [to permanent
resident] as a matter of discretion.
Immigration and Naturalization Service
District Director A.H. Guigni, in his Oct.
2, 1985 decision denying Margaret Ran-
dall's application for permanent resident
status and giving her thirty days to leave
the country
Immigration Court, El Paso, Texas, March 1986.
Feminist author Margaret Randall is on the witness
stand. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at-
torney Guadalupe Gonzalez is attempting to demonstrate
that Randall should be deported as a subversive because
a poetry magazine she once edited has been described in
print as a "revolutionary weapon:"
Randall: [Revolutionary weapon] is a metaphor,
Ms. Gonzalez. I think that...
Gonzalez: What's a metaphor?
* David Cole is a staff attorney for the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights in New York. He represents Margaret Randall.
An earlier version of this article appeared in THE NATION, July
21, 1988.
Randall: The use of the word "revolutionary
weapon" when referring to a magazine which is
made of print and words and pictures. It is a meta-
phor and I would also ask you to look at other
things in those three issues which seem so impor-
tant. There's a letter that deeply criticizes aspects
of the Cuban revolutionary experience at that time,
specifically stating that the writer of the letter feels
that it was non-humanitarian not to let people out
of the country. So we gave expression in the maga-
zine to many of the feelings which were being
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Gonzalez: Communist feelings?
Randall: All kinds of feelings.
Gonzalez: I mean, did you ever have an article in
one of your last three publications extolling the vir-
tues of the free enterprise system?'
For more than four years the United States govern-
ment tried to deport feminist author Margaret Randall
for the political content of her publications. The legal ba-
sis for the government's case against Randall was the
McCarran-Walter Act, the infamous 1952 law that au-
thorizes the government to exclude and deport non-citi-
zens for any number of ill-defined ideological "crimes." 2
The McCarran-Walter Act was passed during the height
of the Cold War,3 and remains on the books to this day.
Under the authority of the McCarran-Walter Act,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
placed Margaret Randall under intense scrutiny. Her
"crime" has been characterized in different ways by the
immigration officials who have dealt with her case. In
October 1985, an INS District Director denied her appli-
cation for permanent resident status and ordered her to
leave the country within thirty days because he found
that her "writings go far beyond mere dissent."' In Au-
gust 1986, Immigration Judge Martin F. Spiegel also
concluded that Randall should be barred from living in
the U.S. permanently and ordered her deported because,
in his view, her writings "advocate the economic, interna-
tional, and governmental doctrines of world commu-
nism."'5 And, according to the INS attorneys who prose-
cuted the case, "Randall's writings are her own
indictment against herself."6
In July 1989, Randall's case came to a surprising and
successful close. The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), ruling on Randall's appeal from Judge Spiegel's
deportation order, found that she was still a United
States citizen, and therefore should never have been sub-
jected to deportation proceedings in the first place. Ran-
dall was born a United States citizen, but the government
had treated her as an alien ever since 1967, when, living
in Mexico, she took out Mexican citizenship in order to
1. In re Randall, Deportation Hearing Transcript at 165-66
(March 17, 1986).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982). The future of the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act has recently been called into question, first
by Congress, and second by a federal court. On December 22,
1987, Congress enacted a one-year provision that temporarily
overrode much of the McCarran-Walter Act. Under this provi-
sion, "no alien may be denied a visa or excluded from admission
into the United States . . .or subject to deportation because of
any past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associa-
tions which, if engaged in by a United States citizen in the
United States, would be protected under the Constitution of the
United States." Foreign Relations Authorization Act, §901(a),
Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1399, 1399-1400 (1987). The
law contained a number of problematic exceptions, including an
exception from the above guarantee for all members of the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization, and was effective for only one
year, but it appeared to reflect a readiness in Congress to do
away with much of the Act's ideological provisions.
Section 901 appeared to resolve Margaret Randall's case.
The INS admitted in February 1988 that Section 901 a pplied
to Randall's case, and that therefore she could not be denied
permanent resident status because of her writings. However, the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which was considering
be able to work to support her family. The BIA found
that she had not voluntarily relinquished her United
States citizenship when she became a Mexican citizen,
because she did so out of economic compulsion. Thus, the
INS was not only trying to deport a woman for her po-
etry; it was trying to deport a United States citizen.
The record of the INS's case against Randall stands
as a testament to the ideology and mechanism of censor-
ship. During the proceedings, the INS subpoenaed every
Randall's appeal, did not issue its decision, and in October 1988
Congress changed the law and the INS changed its position vis-
a-vis Randall. Congress extended Section 901 for two years, but
limited its protections to aliens seeking non-immigrant (or non-
permanent resident) visas. Foreign Operations Appropriations
Act § 555, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 102 Stat. 2268 (1988). As a
result, the INS revoked its prior position, and argued once
again that Randall should be denied permanent resident status
and deported because of the "world communis[t]" character of
her writings.
The second important development is that in January 1988,
a federal district court held several deportation provisions of the
McCarran-Walter Act unconstitutional as applied to aliens liv-
ing in the United States. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee v. Meese, 714 F.Supp. 1060 (C. D. Cal. 1989). The
court held that the First Amendment protects aliens living in
the United States just as it protects citizens. The government
has appealed the decision.
3. At the time Congress specifically found that the Commu-
nist Party posed an immediate danger to the survival of the
United States government. See Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951); see also Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). Thirty-five years later, the
United States government still stands, suggesting that the im-
mediacy of the threat perceived in 1952 was somewhat
exaggerated.
4. INS District Director Dec. at 7 (Oct. 2, 1985), reprinted
in Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
5. Immigration Judge Dec. at 23 (Aug. 28, 1986).
6. BIA Oral Argt. Transc. at 17 (Oct. 20, 1987).
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book, article, and poem that Randall ever published, and
offered into evidence thousands of pages of Randall's
publications. The immigration judge, the only one actu-
ally to count them, reported that he had reviewed 2,744
pages of Randall's writings.7 The record also includes an
848-page transcript from Randall's deportation hearing,
and hundreds of pages of legal briefs.
This record details the attempt of the state to excise
Margaret Randall from within the national borders and
the national consciousness. It is an especially rich source
for studying the ideology of censorship for a number of
reasons. First, unlike the vast majority of persons affected
by the McCarran-Walter Act, Randall was here in the
United States when all of this began. Because Randall is
here. she enjoys due process rights under the Constitution
not enjoyed by non-citizens abroad, and therefore the
government had to explain and support with evidence its
reasons for deporting her!8 As a result, the government
created a voluminous legal record, composed principally
7. Immigration Judge Dec. at 20.
8. The Supreme Court has long held that aliens not living
in the United States and seeking to enter are entitled only to
whatever process Congress gives them by statute: "Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned." Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (upholding against a non-resident
alien a "summary exclusion" procedure that provided no notice,
no hearing, and allowed for exclusion based on undisclosed con-
fidential information). However, "once an alien lawfully enters
and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our border.
Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth
Amendments and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
n.5 (1953) (holding that same "summary exclusion" procedure
could not be applied to returning resident alien, who is entitled
to due process) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161
(1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
of Randall's writings and her explications thereof offered
during her deportation hearing, as well as an even more
substantial public record in the vast media coverage of
this case. Ironically, the government has probably done
more to further Randall's "subversive" views by seeking
to deport her than she could ever have done on her own.
Second, in Randall's case, unlike many other ideologi-
cal exclusion and deportation cases, the government did
not even allege that Randall was an actual threat to any-
one, much less to national security. In many cases de-
nominated "ideological," the government at least asserts
that a concrete threat is involved, even if it often cannot
support its assertion. 9 Even on the surface, the sole
grounds for denying Randall permanent residence and or-
dering her deported were her politics.
Finally, the McCarran-Walter Act itself is written in
purely ideological terms. To exclude or deport a non-citi-
zen under the Act, the INS need not demonstrate or
charge that the person poses a concrete threat or would
harm the community in any particular manner. The law
turns explicitly and solely on political advocacy and asso-
ciation. The statute provides that all of the following
classes of persons shall be ineligible for visas, excludable,
and deportable: anarchists; persons affiliated with any
communist or totalitarian party, or "any section, subsidi-
9. Thus, for example, in justifying the exclusion of Patricia
Lara, a Colombian journalist who attempted to visit the United
States in 1986 to attend an honors dinner at her alma mater,
the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, Assis-
tant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams accused Lara of being a
"terrorist" on CBS's "60 Minutes," but never supported the
charge with evidence, and never allowed Lara a chance to re-
fute the charge. The Colombian government subsequently pro-
tested the United States' action, and said it had no evidence
that Lara, a journalist with an established paper in Colombia,
was a terrorist.
3
Cole: WHAT'S A METAPHOR?: THE DEPORTATION OF A POET
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1989
Law and Liberation
ary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such associa-
tion or party"; persons who practice or advocate polyg-
amy; persons who "advocate the economic, international,
and governmental doctrines of world communism," or be-
long to any organization so advocating; persons who "ad-
vocate or teach ...the unlawful damage, injury, or de-
struction of property"; and those who write or publish, or
"knowingly circulate, distribute, print, or display" mater-
ials that advocate any one of five proscribed beliefs.10
I would like to turn the tables and analyze the politi-
cal content of the INS's views. I do so because I believe
that, to paraphrase the INS, the government's arguments
are the McCarran-Walter Act's own indictment against
itself. The Randall record presents a rare glimpse at ex-
plicit ideological punishment. The INS and the McCar-
ran-Walter Act serve as gatekeepers to the nation's soul.
It is not because Randall poses any actual threat to na-
tional security, but because toleration of her ideas
touches upon a national insecurity, that the INS sought
to expel her from the United States, and to censor her
from the national discourse.
II.
Margaret Randall is a fifty-two year old mother of
four children. She is an internationally acclaimed author
of more than 40 books, including many oral histories doc-
umenting the daily lives of women, religious workers, and
writers in contemporary Cuba and. Nicaragua. Her
books, which include CUBAN WOMEN Now, SANDINO'S
DAUGHTERS, and CHRISTIANS IN THE NICARAGUAN
REVOLUTION, are widely available in the United States,
and frequently assigned in courses in Latin American
Studies and Women's Studies. Her quarterly bilingual
journal EL CORNO EMPLUMADO (THE PLUMED HORN),
published from Mexico in the sixties, was the first of its
kind to introduce prominent Latin American and North
American authors such as Octavio Paz, Ernesto
Cardenal, Alejandra Pizarnik, Alan Ginsberg, Ezra
Pound and Denise Levertoff to new English- and Span-
ish-reading audiences. Throughout her career, Randall
has sought to foster cultural exchange between citizens of
the Americas.
Born in the United States, Randall left this country in
her early 20s. For the next 23 years, until her return to
the United States in January 1984, she lived in Mexico,
Cuba and Nicaragua. She became a Mexican citizen in
1967 in order to secure employment there to support her
children. As a result, the United States revoked her U.S.
citizenship, an action which only now has been reversed.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6). The pro-
scribed beliefs are: (1) the overthrow by force, violence, or other
unconstitutional means of the Government of the United States
or all forms of law; (2) the duty, necessity, or propriety of the
unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers (either of
specific individual or of officers generally) of the government,
because of his or their official character; (3) the unlawful dam-
age, injury, or destruction of property; (4) sabotage; (5) the ec-
onomic international, and governmental doctrines of world com-
munism or the establishment in the United States of a




Listen. These voices are under attack.
Ismaela of the dark tobacco house. Grandma.
A maid her lifetime of winters, granddaughter of slaves.
Straight to my eyes:
"my mama used to tell me, one of these days
the hens gonna shit upwards!
And I'd stare at those hens' asses, wondering
when will that happen?
When we pushed the big ones down
and pulled the little ones up!"
"For Mama, Papa, and Blackie" she wrote
on the poem she left to say goodbye.
Nicaragua, 1977.
Disappear or be disappeared.
Dora Maria whose gaze
her mother always knew.
She trembled at her first delivery,
then took a city fearlessly.
Rain and the river rising. Catalina
chases her ducks that stray.
"And my months," she cries,
on that platform with poles, a house
to do over and over.
"My months gone in the hospital at Iquitos
and the full moon
bringing a madness to my head."
Her body is light against my touch.
A woman's voice, parting such density of rain.
Xuan, my cold hands in hers,
evokes the barracks.
"Soldiers who were our brothers."
Night after night, village by village.
Quang Tri, 1974.
Gunfire replaced by quiet conversation.
The work of women.
Xuan's history, too, is under attack.
Dominga brings her memory down
from the needle trade, Don Pedro,
her own babies dead from hunger.
"I want to tell you my story," she says,
"leave it to the young ones
so they'll know."
We are rocking. We are laughing.
This woman who rescued the flag at Ponce,
Puerto Rico, 1937.
Known by that act alone,
until a book carries her words. Her voice.
I bring you these woman. Listen.
They speak, but their lives are under attack.
They too are denied adjustment of status
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Randall returned to the United States in 1984. After
marrying a lifelong friend, she decided that she wanted
to remain near her elderly parents in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. Because the government considered her an alien,
Randall applied for permanent resident status." Absent
ideological issues, she would be immediately eligible for
such status because of her strong family ties. Her par-
ents, siblings, and two of her children are U.S. citizens.
But because Randall has at various times publicly dis-
sented from U.S. government policy toward various na-
tions in the world, the INS has twice denied her perma-
nent resident status, and has ordered her deported.
III.
When I tell people about the government's efforts to
deport Margaret Randall, they are virtually always
shocked. "Do we still do that?" they inevitably ask. The
answer, unfortunately, is yes. To those of us brought up
to believe that the United States is a tolerant society
committed to freedom of expression, the case seems to be
an aberration. But history shows that, far from an aber-
ration, this type of "exclusion" has been central to our
nation's history.
Indeed, the first case of ideological deportation in this
country predates the birth of the nation. In 1635, the
Massachusetts legislature banished Roger Williams, who
went on to found Rhode Island, for disseminating "newe
& dangerous opinions" against the authority of the
state. 2 The Alien Act of 1798 authorized the President
to expel "all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to
the peace and safety of the United States.. . ."" And.
much of the language of the McCarran-Walter Act
stems from a statute that dates to the turn of the century,
when Congress first made "anarchism" a deportable po-
litical idea after a self-proclaimed "Anarchist" (a native
U.S. citizen) assassinated President McKinley.'
Professor Michael Rogin has shown that throughout
the development of the United States, our country has
conceived its citizenry's freedom and self-identity in op-
position to those considered less than citizens. It began
with the Native Americans:
Although Indian wars actually exemplified state vi-
olence, they fed an opposite myth - the myth of
1!. Permanent resident status is the first step toward natu-
ralization. A nonimmigrant alien in the United States who has
the requisite close family ties may apply for adjustment of sta-
tus to permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1255. One must generally
be a permanent resident for at least three years to become eligi-
ble to apply for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a). A perma-
nent resident alien has the right to live in the United States
permanently, subject to deportation for various enumerated
offenses.
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides aliens living
in the United States two separate and independent opportuni-
ties to apply for adjustment of status to permanent resident: the
first to a District Director, and the second to an immigration
judge in a deportation proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2 (1988).
12. Mitchell C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The
Evolution of a Policy, 2 GEORGETOWN IMM. L.J. 1, 6 n.25
(1987).
13. Alien Act of 1798, Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570, 571.
14. See Tilner, 2 GEORGETOWN IMM. L.J. at 24-30 (cited in
the self-made man. . . .Early settlers made Indi-
ans a threat to community. . . .White Americans
contrasted their own freedom, disciplined by self-re-
straint, with the subversive, idle, and violent free-
dom of the Indians. The self-reliant American
gained his freedom, won his authority, and defined
the American national identity in violent Indian
combat in the West.' 5
Rogin argues that U.S. citizens' early relationship to the
Native Americans, whose land they appropriated, finds
The question the McCarran-Walter Act
raises is whether a country can ever call
itself pluralist or humanist when it ex-
pels and excludes persons like Randall
because they hold dissenting points of
view.
parallels in their relationship to slaves, and ultimately to
all considered different, or "alien:"
Indians were the first people to stand in American
history as emblems of disorder, civilized breakdown,
and alien control. . . .The violent conquest of In-
dians legitimized violence against other alien
groups, making coexistence appear to be unneces-
sary. The paranoid style in American politics . ..
goes back to responses to Indians. The series of Red
scares that have swept the country since the 1870s
have roots in the original red scares. Later counter-
subversive movements attacked aliens, but the peo-
ple who originally assaulted reds were themselves
aliens in the land. . . .The need to draw rigid
boundaries between the alien and the self suggests
fears of too dangerous an intimacy between them.' 6
note 13).
15. Michael Rogin, RONALD REAGAN, THE MOVIE AND
OTHER EPISODES IN POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY 49-50 (1987).
16. Id. at 50. Rogin suggests that the psychological source
for this ambivalence may be located in our early childhood rela-
tions to our mothers, relying on the work of Dorothy Dinner-
stein and Nancy Chodorow. See id. at 290-92. See also Dorothy
Dinnerstein, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976);
Nancy Chodorow, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978).
This view holds that our initial self-definition, in separating
from a mother, has long-standing implications for our relation-
ships with other "Others" throughout our lifetime. Rogin
claims that attacks on women have played a central role in the
"history of American demonology":
Countersubversion connects political to sexual anxiety by.
raising the specter of female power. Subversive women
were the targets in the witchcraft persecutions, in an-
tiabolitionist hysteria, in turn of the century racism, and
in the Red scares.
Rogin, RONALD REAGAN, THE MOVIE at 290. Whatever view
one takes of the role of mother-centered childrearing, it is unde-
niable that like Native Americans, blacks, and aliens, women
play the role of marginalized "Other" in our society, and it is
on their subordination that much of white men's "freedom" has
rested. It is no mere coincidence that the INS singled out Mar-
garet Randall, a vocal feminist, for its 1980s Red scare.
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"Foreigners" are perhaps the quintessential "other."
The very word used to describe non-citizens, "alien," sug-
gests a deep-seated need to distinguish us from them, in-
siders from outsiders, those proud to be an American
from those who are not. It can no longer be said, if it ever
could, that the McCarran-Walter Act is designed to save
us from any concrete threat. Rather, it serves its purpose,
as INS attorney Guadalupe Gonzalez implicitly recog-
nized in her argument to the BIA,1" by affirming through
exclusion what "Americans" are not - communists, an-
archists, homosexuals, etc. Our borders distinguish us
from what lies beyond, marking out our special identity,
both geographically and, through the McCarran-Walter
Act, ideologically.
Thus, just as the European settlers' "freedom" to cre-
ate their own new society in America required the denial
of Native American's personhood, and just as slavery
made possible the unity of all classes of white men before
the Civil War,18 so the exclusion and deportation of polit-
ically incorrect "aliens" paradoxically allows us the lib-
erty to be "free." The danger posed by unbounded free-
dom is that we will lose the social anchor of our "values."
There is a fundamental tension between the desire to be
free individuals and the desire to be part of a community
that defines itself through affirming particular substan-
tive values. That tension is encapsulated in the First
Amendment, which suggests that our nation's primary
substantive value is government neutrality in the sphere
of substantive values. But too much freedom threatens
our sense of community. The McCarran-Walter Act thus
sets the boundaries for our freedom. But at what price?
It affirms our faith in democracy by casting out people
who believe in other systems of government. It affirms
our faith in pluralism by barring from our borders any-
one who is perceived as advocating totalitarianism. It
privileges narrow nationalist self-definition over the unin-
hibited exchange of ideas, which is itself one of our most
important freedoms. It promotes "freedom" by denying
the fundamental humanity of another human being. The
question that the McCarran-Walter Act raises is whether
a country can ever call itself pluralist or humanist when
it expels and excludes persons like Randall because they
hold dissenting points of view.
IV.
The trouble began with an investigation sparked by
Randall's initial application to become a permanent resi-
17. See infra, text accompanying notes 30-45.
18. The Richmond Enquirer in 1856 editorialized as
follows:
In this country alone does perfect equality of civil and
social privilege exist among the white population, and it
exists solely because we have black slaves. Freedom is not
possible without slavery.
(quoted in Rogin, RONALD REAGAN, THE MOVIE at 53 (cited in
note 16)).
19. Randall's initial application for adjustment of status to
permanent resident alien was made to District Director A.H.
Guigni, in El Paso, Texas.
dent.19 The result of that investigation set the stage for
all that would follow: "The investigation revealed that
the applicant is a poet and a writer who has had several
of her books published."2
This not especially startling fact led the District Di-
rector handling Randall's application to "examine" five
of her books, "for the purpose of determining whether the
applicant would be excludable under the [McCarran-
Walter Act]." 21 The bulk of his decision consists of selec-
tive quotations from two books: PART OF THE SOLUTION,
PORTRAIT OF A REVOLUTIONARY (1973), a collection of
poems and journal entries; and SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE
(1975), a report on the condition of women in North Vi-
etnam during the last years of the Vietnam War. The
passages quoted include criticism of the United States'
bombing of Cambodia, of the National Guard's killing of
four students at Kent State, and of the propagandistic
character of Voice of America. Some of the quotations
were not even written by Randall but by Robert Cohen,
the father of her youngest child; others were drawn from
Randall's poetry. The District Director drew no distinc-
tions between poetry, prose, Randall's words, or Cohen's
words, presumably because the McCarran-Walter Act it-
self makes no distinctions. Exclusion may be based on
any words published or even circulated by the individual
in question.
22
In addition to mingling Randall's words with others'
words, the District Director made no attempt to distin-
guish between the literal and the figurative in Randall's
work. Thus, he quoted Cohen's description of a childhood
diary Randall kept as "one of the 'pure products' of the
Amerika(sic) Margaret has now dedicated her life to de-
stroying. ' 2 The District Director's parenthetical suggests
that he does not distinguish "America," the United
States, from "Amerika," that part of mainstream U.S.
culture that was the subject of progressive critique during
the 1960s. From the District Director's point of view,
criticism of any aspect of the U.S. is criticism of the
whole. Similarly, the District Director found condemning
Cohen's description of Randall's poetry magazine, EL
CORNO EMPLUMADO, as "a revolutionary weapon," and
devoted a full paragraph to Randall's poem "I am At-
tica," about the prison riots there in 1971 .24 All the
quotes are presented matter-of-factly, for, as the District
Director says, they "speak for themselves."25 In other
words, the District Director implies, Randall's poetry and
journal entries require no interpretation, no engagement
by the reader, and can be read meaningfully without ref-
20. INS District Director Dec. at 1, reprinted in Randall v.
Meese, 854 F.2d at 483.
21. INS District Director Dec. at 2, 854 F.2d at 483.
22. Thus, if the District Director were an alien, he could be
deported for quoting Randall's words in his decision! And if the
editors of this journal were aliens, they could be deported for
publishing Randall's poetry. See 1 Yale J. of
Law & Lib. - (1989). Indeed, INS attorneys argued that a
political cartoon drawn by another but published in EL CORNO
EMPLUMADO should be held against Randall.
23. INS District Director Dec. at 2, quoting 'PART OF THE
SOLUTION at 1; 854 F.2d at 484.
24. INS District Director Dec. at 4, 854 F.2d at 485.
25. INS District Director Dec. at 7, 854 F.2d at 486.
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erence to context. To the District Director, "[tihe record
of the applicant is self-evident."26
The District Director's literal interpretive strategy, if
it can be called that, is no accident. This reductionism is
necessary to the censorship of Randall. Recognizing met-
aphor requires an acknowledgment of ambiguity, and if
the author's meaning is figurative or ambiguous, it is un-
likely to fit neatly within the statute's prosaically-defined
proscribed doctrines. Similarly, the possibility that each
reader might interpret a writer's work differently calls
into question the authority of any particular reader. Even
more problematically, the recognition of the reader's af-
firmative role in interpretation implicates the reader,
here an INS official, in the joint production of the pro-
scribed meaning. Thus, the commonplaces of a modern-
day understanding of interpretation deeply undermine the
possibility of engaging in the silencing mandated by the
McCarran-Walter Act. But if the words "speak for
themselves" and can be read "literally" (whatever that
means), the task of the District Director is simply that of
testing the "fit" between the author's "self-evident" texts
and the statute's "self-evident" terms.
Even so, it was apparently not self-evident to the Dis-
trict Director that any of Randall's writings fell within
the terms of the McCarran-Walter Act. The District Di-
rector thus referred to, but did not ultimately rely upon,
the Act's statutory exclusion provisions. Rather, he de-
nied Randall's application as a discretionary matter. In
his view, "[h]er writings go far beyond mere dissent, dis-
agreement with, or criticism of the United States or its
policies." 7 His opinion does not explain how the quoted
passages go "beyond mere dissent," or where this stan-
dard comes from. Thus, even though the District Director
read Randall all too literally when it came to interpreting
his own authority, he adopted a discretionary standard
without support in the "literal" terms of the statute.
2 8
The District Director did find support in the spirit of
the McCarran-Walter Act. The history of immigration
laws directed at "subversive aliens," he explained, dem-
onstrates an intent to guard against aliens who are "det-
rimental to the national interest." Invocation of this "na-
tional interest" justified abandoning the detailed terms of
the Act in order to rely vaguely and perfunctorily on dis-
cretion. The District Director reasoned that the spirit of
the Act empowered him to draw a discretionary line be-
tween acceptable "mere dissent" and unacceptable ideas
"far beyond mere dissent." Because this line, like Ran-
dall's writing, was apparently "self-evident," he did not
explicate it.
26. INS District Director Dec. at 7.
27. INS District Director Dec. at 7.
28. While the statute vests the District Director with the
authority to deny adjustment of status to someone who is statu-
torily eligible, this appears to be the first instance in which a
discretionary denial of permanent resident status was based
upon the political content of the applicant's views. Discretionary
denials are ordinarily based on such "adverse factors" as mis-
representations in applications for entry, recent criminal convic-
tions, or deliberate and repeated violations of immigration laws.
2 C. Gordon and H. Rosenfeld, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE § 7.7d at 7-99 to 7-103 (1987).
The District Director's location of the line at "mere
dissent" reflects the tension underlying an act of censori-
ous exclusion in a community whose founding ideology
emphasizes the primacy of freedom of expression. To
claim that Randall's writing is unacceptable because it is
"beyond mere dissent" implies that "mere dissent" is ac-
ceptable. Our national commitment to the freedom to
dissent is simultaneously affirmed and diminished in the
very act of excluding dissent: we define our freedom by
denying the freedom of others.
V.
Once the District Director denied Randall's applica-
tion for permanent residence, she became subject to de-
portation proceedings before an Immigration Judge, and
the censor's wand was passed to the INS attorneys who
prosecuted that proceeding. Echoing the District Direc-
tor, INS attorneys argued that the national interest de-
manded that Randall be found ineligible for permanent
resident status and deported, not only as a statutory mat-
ter, but also as a matter of "discretion." Relying on the
McCarran-Walter Act, INS attorneys claimed: (1) that
Randall's writings advocated the "doctrines of world
communism;"29 (2) that she had been a member of com-
munist-affiliated organizations; 30 and (3) that she was
not committed to the "good order and happiness of the
United States."'"
During the course of the deportation hearing Randall
was compelled to answer questions about her beliefs and
opinions regarding Vietnam, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico,
communism, Marxism, socialism, and even contraception.
The INS offered into evidence thousands of pages of
Randall's writings, and advanced all of the following as
reasons why Randall should not be eligible to live here:
-She published political cartoons critical of the U.S. in
EL CORNO EMPLUMADO;
-She dedicated an issue of that journal to Huey Newton;
-She ran an ad for a book by Karl Marx in the journal;
-She held certain Marxist historical views;
-She published poems and articles in Cuban and Nicara-
guan journals and newspapers;
*She wrote a poem called "Che;"
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G)(v).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(C).
31. This standard had never before been invoked to estab-
lish inadmissibility. It is not found in the McCarran-Walter
Act, but in the standard for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. §
1427(a)(3). The INS attorneys sought to bootstrap this stan-
dard onto the question of admissibility, by invoking the provi-
sion that renders excludable aliens who are "ineligible to citi-
zenship." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(22). But the Act defines
"ineligible to citizenship" as limited to individuals who are
"permanently debarred from becoming a citizen of the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(19). And the "good order and hap-
piness of the United States" standard is a temporally limited
one: the applicant must satisfy this standard only for the five
years preceding her application for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. §
1427(a). Thus, the standard can never "permanently debar[]"
one from becoming a citizen, and has no applicability to the
admissibility question.
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-She interviewed communists, among others, for some of
her books on Latin American oral history;
-She was a friend of Ernesto Cardenal, a Nicaraguan
poet and the Minister of Culture;
-She admitted to being an atheist.
The scope of these examples reveals the INS attor-
neys' strategy. Rather than limit themselves to proving
ineligibility under specific statutory provisions, they
sought to demonstrate that Randall was generally unde-
serving of the United States through a scattershot attack.
They urged the Immigration Judge to entertain broadly-
framed arguments directed to his discretion, which, in
their view, justified the introduction of evidence that
Randall was an atheist, that she supported Black Panther
activist Huey Newton, and that she published cartoons
making fun of U.S. government officials. Their unprece-
dented invocation of the "good order and happiness of the
United States" standard is particularly revealing, for it
allowed them to ask explicitly the question that the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act implicitly asks of all aliens - are
you a "true American?" Randall, the INS attorneys as-
serted, is not.
The spirit of the INS attorneys' approach comes
through most clearly in the briefs they filed and the ar-
guments they advanced after the hearing and on appeal.
The introductory paragraph of the INS's Post-Hearing
Memorandum reflects the tone that the INS attorneys
adopted throughout the proceedings:
Randall once wrote of Fidel Castro: "Half a million
people had tears in their eyes as they shouted the
support of this man who is without doubt the most
brilliant, the most courageous, and most humane
leader of our or any time." Gosh. Castro (?), who
in 1986 is swarming Nicaragua, instructing the
Sandinistas in the torture of political prisoners?
Castro (?), who in Caligulan fashion dispersed
thousands of human beings to this country who
have suffered and told of the horrors that are the
instruments of his governance? Yes, Randall has
perpetuated the myth and the lie. Indeed, she has
done so with mundane reliability spanning twenty
years. Yes, she has published and exported the lie,
arraying the distinctive Communist assault on hu-
manity in the garb of guerrillas in green fatigues
who speak of the liberation of the oppressed classes,
of world solidarity, and of the need to rid them-
selves of the imperialist monster to the North -
indisputably Communism with hispanic elan."2
While this hysteria remained unchanged throughout
the case, its underlying rationale developed over time. At
the outset, INS attorneys relied principally on the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act's historical basis - the threat that
the Soviet Union would, through world communism,
overthrow the United States. They stated that their pur-
pose was not to punish Randall for her "patent defama-
tion of the Government of the United States,"" but "to
prevent a world-wide Communist conspiracy from accom-
plishing its purpose in this country."'
To underscore the importance of this purpose and the
dangers of communism, the INS attorneys prefaced their
Freedom is merely a symbol to fight for,
Randall a symbol to fight against. What
freedom means and who Randall is are
lost in this clash of symbols.
analysis of Randall's writings with extensive quotations
from seemingly every statute Congress has ever passed on
the subject of communism. These statutes, promulgated
in the paranoia of the McCarthy Era, have hardly been
used since the late 1950's. They are premised on the
1952 Congress' finding that there was a secretive world-
wide communist conspiracy that would stop at nothing to
gain its ends:
There exists a world Communist movement which,
in its origins, its development, and its present prac-
tice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose
purpose it is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration into
other groups (governmental and otherwise), espio-
nage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means
deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totali-
tarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the
world through the medium of a world-wide Com-
munist organization."
Yet the INS attorneys could not adopt the McCarthy
Era rhetoric wholesale, because from hindsight its para-
noia is all too evident. The INS attorneys could not
maintain that the United States would be physically en-
dangered if it permitted Randall to remain. Without that
link to a concrete threat, the paranoia of the 1950s be-
comes pure, undisguised animus. Of Randall's CHRIS-
TIANS IN THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION, a book of in-
terviews, the INS attorneys write:
Randall confesses, "I am a Marxist and an Athe-
ist," but wait, the good news is that she loves Chris-
tians and yes, Fidel, too, loves Christians. Indeed in
Cuba, Randall tells us there is no religious repres-
sion - absolutely none. What's more, the book ex-
plains those dirty imperialists can't stand to hear
that Fidel loves Christians and Marxists/Atheists,
like Margaret Randall, love Christians and that
Christians are part of the happy FSLN family here
in Nicaragua. .... .
Toward Randall herself, the, INS attorneys adopted a
"love it or leave it" stance: "Margaret Randall is a fifty-
34. Id. at 33.
35. 50 U.S.C. § 781.
36. INS Post-Hearing Mem. at 55.
32. INS Post-Hearing Mem. at 1 (Aug. 1, 1986).
33. Id. at 23.
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year old malcontented expatriate who has deliberately
chosen to live a self-imposed political exile from the
United States for the majority of her adult life."137
Thus, the prejudice that the McCarthy Era bred lives
on. But unadulterated animus is difficult to justify, and
must be rationalized if it is to call upon the power of the
state. Its modern-day vindication comes in even more
purely distilled ideological terms: the "war" is no longer
between the United States and the Soviet Union, two
countries, but between "democracy" and "communism,"
two ideas. It is a war ultimately with ourselves. The en-
emy, according to INS attorney Gonzalez, is not so much
the communism out there as our own internal "ambiva-
lence." 38 By deporting Randall, we reaffirm that our ide-
als are so valuable that they cannot be questioned, so val-
uable that they justify the expulsion from our midst of
those who question them. Ideological deportation be-
comes a statement of fundamentalist faith in "America."
This is best expressed in Gonzalez' argument to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), in which she urged
the BIA to "keep faith with the American people" by
finding Randall deportable:
The American system of government is a better and
a freer system than those Margaret Randall
chooses to join and to support. Our nation is and
must be deeply committed to its democratic form of
government, and it is worthy of champions in that
cause. The Board has an opportunity in this case to
keep faith with the American people in their fight
against communism. 9
Gonzalez' call for a reaffirmation of faith was accompa-
nied not by a citation to the McCarran-Walter Act, nor
to any case law applying the Act, but of Allan Bloom's
THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND:
There is an enemy here, and that enemy is ambiva-
lence and the danger is one that has been recog-
nized as recently as this year by a noted author and
professor out of the University of Chicago. . . . Ir
his book, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND,
the danger is that we will dilute the battle between
freedom and communism to the level of no fault
auto insurance. The danger is that we will view this
case in a context where there is no right or wrong.
But there is a right and a wrong. The American
Congress has stated that our system of government
is right, and it is good, and the communist system is
bad. We are an intolerant government. We are in-
tolerant of world communism, and we are intolerant
of those individuals like Randall,.who attempt to in-
crease its hold on the world. As columnist George
Wills so aptly put it, "America is not a hotel. The
American door does not swing open to all types of
men and women, to all types of lifestyles, and to all
types of political ideologies. "'4
37. INS Appeal Brief at I (May 29, 1987).
38. BIA Oral Argt. Transc. at 19.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id. at 19.
Gonzalez effectively concedes that we are no longer pro-
tecting the nation itself, but the "national perspective:"
"It is a perspective in favor of god and country, a per-
spective in favor of freedom and one for which we must
never apologize."4
Gonzalez' citation of Allan Bloom is telling. Bloom's
book is part of a conservative movement that criticizes
the loss of "values" in modern liberal education and soci-
ety. The book's success as a best-seller is consistent with
the resurgence of fundamentalist religions and the popu-
larity of Ronald Reagan. Reagan's Education Secretary
William Bennett waged a vigorous public campaign
against the so-called "ethical relativism" of liberal
pedagogy, in which the United States and the Soviet
Union are presented as two different social systems, not
as "right" and "wrong" systems. All of these phenomena
share a rejection of the doubt that liberalism appears to
engender. From this view, Jimmy Carter personifies lib-
eralism's ambiguity; Ronald Reagan is the paradigm of
conservatism's simple faith. Gonzalez picks up on this
trend, and in her hands, democracy becomes an article of
faith, not a system to be discussed and questioned."'
Gonzalez' argument is a remarkably honest defense
of censorship. Censorship is predicated on the danger
posed by ideas, but it is rarely openly defended on those
grounds. Gonzalez asks the Board to deport Randall not
to protect the United States from any concrete threat but
simply to "make a statement . . . [a] statement against
Randall, and for freedom." '43 The impossibility of af-
firming freedom while deporting a person because of her
ideas does not occur to Gonzalez. Freedom is merely a
symbol to fight for, Randall a symbol to fight against.
What freedom means and who Randall is are lost in this
clash of symbols.
The INS attorneys took on their task with true ideo-
logical passion. The task - to prosecute a woman solely
for the political content of her books - required an ex-
plicit justification of censorship, for there could be no
masking of the ideological nature of their actions. When
the rhetoric of the McCarthy Era struck hollow thirty-
five years after the fact, the INS attorneys turned to Al-
lan Bloom, and issued a fundamentalist call to an
unquestioning faith. From this "national perspective,"
faith in our values is more important than the substance
of the values themselves. At that point, and only at that
point, ideological punishment is, as Justice Holmes said,"perfectly logical:"
41. Id.
42. The parallels to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's
death threat against author Salman Rushdie for writing a novel
that allegedly satirizes the Muslim faith underscore the essen-
tially fundamentalist tenor of the Reagan Administration's ac-
tions. While the United States has certainly not threatened to
kill Randall for the politically sacrilegious content of her work,
it does seek forcibly to separate her from her family, her home,
and her work solely for that reason. And like the Ayatollah, the
INS fails to take into account the fictional character of the
work, assigning a rigidly literal meaning to the text. For less
extreme parallels between American ideology and religious
faith, see S. Levinson, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-53 (1988).
43. BIA Oral Argt. Transc. at 20.
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Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to
me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your
premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition."
The difference is that Justice Holmes was being ironic.
VI.
The third immigration official to apply the McCar-
ran-Walter Act against Randall was Immigration Judge
Martin F. Spiegel. He held that Randall had advocated
the "doctrines of world communism," and should be de-
ported. His decision, however, lacks the ideological fervor
of the INS attorneys; it reads as if the law simply left
him no choice.
Judge Spiegel made no attempt to justify his decision
as protecting "the national interest" or affirming the val-
ues of freedom and democracy. His decision is dry, tech-
nical and, at its core, empty. He quoted in full the ideo-
logical exclusion provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act
and summarized the INS's allegations. He then listed
each of the exhibits of Randall's writings, assured the
reader that he had "read and studied in their entirety"
all "2,744 pages,"' 5 and concluded that Randall's writ-
ings "advocate the economic, international, and govern-
mental doctrines of world communism as set forth in Sec-
tion 212(a)(28)(G)(v) of the Act.""'
At the point of applying the statute to Randall's writ-
ings, however, the decision skips a beat. Judge Spiegel
failed to quote even a single passage from the 2,744
pages he had "read and studied." Nor did he set forth,
much less apply, the statutory definition of the proscribed
"doctrines of world communism," a definition so specific
and detailed that it is unlikely that anyone has ever so
advocated:
advocating the economic, international, and govern-
mental doctrines of world communism means advo-
cating the establishment of a totalitarian Commu-
nist dictatorship in any or all of the countries of the
world through the medium of an internationally co-
ordinated Communist movement. 7
In effect, Congress' exaggeration of the evils of "commu-
nism" resulted in a statutory definition that almost no
communist would advocate. Yet Judge Spiegel never
cited this definition.
Judge Spiegel's only attempt to justify his conclusion
consisted of his own one-sentence synopses of the general
themes of three books and one article by Randall. He
characterized CUBAN WOMEN Now, a book of interviews
with Cuban women, as "consistent in its praise for the
efforts of the Castro communist revolution in improving
women's rights and conditions in Cuba as well as being
consistently supportive of the communist revolution in
44. Abrams v. United States; 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
45. Immigration Judge Dec. at 20.
46. Id. at 23.
47. 8 U.S.C. § I101(e)(3).
IMMIGRATION LAW
When I ask the experts
"how much time do I have?"
I don't want an answer
in years or arguments.
I must know
if there are hours enough
to mend this relationship,
see a book all the way to its birthing,
stand beside my father
on his journey.
I want to know how many seasons of chamisa




how many red cactus flowers
will bloom beside my door.
I will not follow language
like a dog with its tail between its legs.
I need time equated with music,
hours rising in bread.
years deep from connections.
The present always holds a tremor of the past.
Give me a handful of future
to rub against my lips.
Margaret Randall,
Albuquerque, October 1985
Cuba."' 8 But he did not explain how praise for an ex-
isting communist regime constituted "advocating the es-
tablishment of a totalitarian Communist dictatorship."
The discussion of Randall's works, the most critical sec-
tion of his opinion, reads as if Judge Spiegel was
ashamed of what he was doing, and wanted simply to get
it over with as quickly as possible.
Perhaps because of this uneasiness, Judge Spiegel
continued, after finding Randall statutorily ineligible for
permanent resident status, to say in dicta that on every
other ground, including the exercise of discretion, Ran-
dall deserved to be granted permanent resident status. He
went out of his way to distance himself from both the
District Director's decision, which rested on a discretion-
ary evaluation of Randall's politics, and from the INS
attorneys, who urged a decision on even broader discre-
tionary grounds:
[A]ccording evidentiary weight to respondent's non-
proscribed political opinions would result in the po-
litical opinion of the adjudicating officer being the
determinative factor. Clearly the favorable or unfa-
vorable exercise of discretion cannot and must not
48. Immigration Judge Dec. at 24.
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be based upon the personal political opinion of the
adjudicating officer."9
Thus, Judge Spiegel declared invalid a standardless
discretionary assessment of the political content of Ran-
dall's writings and in its place applied statutory standards
of ineligibility to the same political content. But in the
context of reading a poet's works to determine whether
she advocates a particular political world view, is it any
less arbitrary if the reader applies a Congressional defini-
tion or his own standard? Nonetheless, whether or not it
makes sense, Judge Spiegel's distinction serves an ideo-
logical purpose. It suggests that Judge Spiegel's decision
is founded upon "objective" rather than "subjective" cri-
teria. And this move both distances Judge Spiegel from
responsibility for the decision - it is not his political
opinion but Congress' that requires the denial - and si-
multaneously affirms the United States conception of a
fair and objective administration of laws.
In the end, however, Judge Spiegel's opinion is an ex-
ercise in the absurd. Its bureaucratic abstinence from
rhetorical excess is inconsistent with the spirit of the ide-
ological exclusion provisions it so bureaucratically ap-
plies. It is an act of censorship without ideological com-
mitment. Without such commitment, the deportation
appears all the more senseless. So senseless, in fact, that
Judge Spiegel was apparently unable to undertake the
very task of reading and interpretation that the Act
required.
VII.
Throughout Margaret Randall's ordeal, none of the
government officials who applied the McCarran-Walter
Act engaged Randall as an author, as a person with
To deport a poet from a democratic
country is therefore to deny, ultimately,
both poetry and democracy. It is to re-
ject ambiguity and plurality in favor of
authoritarianism.
whom to communicate. The call to censor permits no ex-
change beyond that necessary to cut off the exchange.
And in the end, each official demanded just such a cut-
off: Margaret Randall's deportation.
Three paradoxes run through the INS officials' treat-
ment of Randall. First, they all pay lip service to our na-
tion's commitment to freedom of speech at the very mo-
ment that they urge Randall's expulsion for the political
content of her views. But none of them addresses the par-
adox created by that assertion. The paradox is so blatant
that it cannot go unstated, but so deep that it cannot be
resolved except by foregoing the censor's role. And both
the law on its face and the political tenor of the times
reinforce the call to censor.
The second paradox may be even deeper and is barely
acknowledged by the INS officials. Their role as censor
requires an explicit faith in the ability to determine an
unproblematic, "literal" meaning. If a text's meaning is
fluid, if it depends upon context and reader, if it requires
the interpretation of metaphors and figures, the INS'
task becomes virtually impossible. The relationships be-
tween author, text, and reader are rendered deeply prob-
lematic by recognition of the complex dynamic that de-
termines a particular reading of a text. It may no longer
make sense to assign responsibility for the reader's inter-
pretation to the author's intention. It becomes unclear
who should be deported: the author, the reader, or the
text itself? Ambiguity, the hallmark of the poet, is the
downfall of the censor. The drive to censor Randall for
her poetry can be viewed not only as an attempt to reaf-
firm the traditional values of democracy and freedom,
but also as a desperate grasp for the deeper security of
immediate, objective, "literal" truth.
The coexistence of those two paradoxes raises a third.
Democracy and freedom are ultimately premised on the
recognition that truth cannot be unmediated or objective.
We tolerate and encourage a plurality of voices in part
because we recognize that no one voice is privileged. De-
mocracy contemplates a process of exchange that seeks
consensus and coexistence, and rejects the authority of
any government official to control the truth. Poetry, liter-
ature, culture, and even law itself require a similar pro-
cess of exchange, and all recognize to some extent the
inability even of the authors themselves to establish a sin-
gle authoritative meaning for their texts.
To deport a poet from a democratic country is there-
fore to deny, ultimately, both poetry and democracy. It is
to reject ambiguity and plurality in favor of authoritari-
anism. It is, in short, to adopt the very totalitarian
precepts from which'the McCarran-Walter Act was pur-
portedly designed to save us.
49. Id. at 31.
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